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SHARON A. HENDERSON 
INGRID MICHELSEN HILLINGER 
DAVID A. GLAZER 
Equitable Distribution: 
Virginia Code Section 20-107 
IN Virginia traditional a limony was the only form of 
recompense a llowed to a divorced spouse until 1977. 
Property was divided according to title, either his, 
hers or theirs. In 1977, the legislature added the pos-
sibility of a "lump sum paymen t" based upon the 
"property in terests of the parties" after considering 
"the contributions, monetary and non-monetary, of 
each party to the well-being of the family," among 
other factors. This language gave little guidance as to 
when such an award migh t be appropriate or what 
specific factors were to be considered. 
A survey conducted by In grid Hillinger for the 
Family Law Section of the Virginia Bar Association 
in the fa ll of 1981 indicated that the role of § 20-107 in 
property division was unclear. Many attorneys were 
still fi ling suits for constructive or resulting trus ts. 
Most believed tha t Virginia sh ould adopt some form 
of equitable distribution. The 1981 Virginia Legisla-
ture h ad a lso recognized the need for change and a p-
pointed a committee to study the problem. HB 691 was 
the result of their s tudy a nd the Virginia General As-
sembly adopted their proposal with few changes, re-
placin g § 20-107 with § 20-107.1 - 20-107.3. Some may 
see § 20-107.1 through § 20-107.3 as a mere exten sion 
and outgrowth of the old § 20-107. To some extent, it 
is, but domestic relations a ttorneys will find them-
selves in a new age. 
I. § 20-107.3: Over v iew a nd 
Policy Considerations 
With a bold s troke of the legislative pen , the 1982 
Virginia Genera l Assembly enacted § 20-107.3, there-
by bringing to the Commonwealth a form of equitable 
distribution of marital assets a nd a revolutionary 
change in the practice of domestic relations law. 
Comm only kn own as the "equitable distribution act," 
it will be referred to herein as EDA. § 20-107.3 a llows 
the court, upon decreeing a final (not a n a mensa) 
divorce or an nulment, to enter a monetary award 
"based upon the equi ties a nd the rights and interests 
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of each party in the marita l property ." I Underlying 
the enactment is the belief tha t a spouse should have 
an interest in assets accumula ted during a m arriage 
which a re not refl ected or protected by the common 
law title a pproach to property , which focuses solely 
on wh o h olds lega l title. In spirit, then , the EDA gives 
courts the power to effect greater justice and fairness 
between the spouses, i.e., to make th e economic inci-
dents of divorce fair and equitable for husband and 
wife .2 
In adopting a form of equitable distribution of m ar-
ital assets, Virginia joins a ll other jurisdictions except 
West Virginia and Mississippi.3 It might be that mis-
ery loves compa ny. The New York equitable distribu-
tion s tatute h as been described as "a legislative 
wonder, lawyers' nightmare, court reporters' dream 
and judges' ba ll a nd chain."4 This a rticle, drawing on 
the experiences of other jurisdictions, attempts to 
highligh t some of the problems and pitfa lls, both 
theoretical and practical, which the new Act involves. 
Under the EDA, the court must, if requested, deter-
mine the legal title, the ownership a nd value of all 
real and person al property of the pa rties, and cla ssify 
the property as "separa te" or "marital" property.5 
The experiences of other jurisdictions indicate that 
these determina tions can be a time-consuming, ex-
pensive undertaking, a nd there is no reason to as-
s um e th a t the Virg inia experience will be a n y 
di fferen t.(; Firs t , one must identify a ll property in 
issue. Second, the court must classify it into separa te 
and marita l property and determine legal title to th e 
marita l property. Accordin g to § 20-107.3(A)(1), sep-
a rate property is all property of wha tever kind ac-
quired before marri age, a ll property acquired during 
the marri age by beques t, devise, descent, survivor-
ship or gift from someone other tha n the other spouse 
and "all property acquired during the marria ge in ex-
cha nge fo r or from the proceeds of sale of separa te 
property, provided tha t such property acquired during 
the m arri age is maintained as separate property." 
Marital property, on the other hand, is defined by § 
20-107.3(A)(2) as " all property titled in the names of 
both parties .. . " and "all other property acquired by 
each party during the marriage which is not separate 
property." The Act establishes a presumption that all 
property acquired during the marriage is marital 
property.? 
Having completed that frequently factious and le-
gally confusing determination of "separate" vs. "mar-
ital," the court must value all the marital property. 
The methods of such valuation are numerous and 
complex. Some suggestions regarding valuation of 
certain types of property are discussed in detail, 
below.8 
After valuation of the marital property, the court 
then considers eleven factors in determining whether 
to make a monetary award and, if so, in what 
amount. Note that nothing in the EDA requires the 
court to enter a monetary award. The Act provides 
only that "the court may grant a monetary award" 
(emphasis added) .9 
Of the eleven factors , some are akin to support con-
sideration: the duration of the marriage, the ages and 
physical and mental conditions of the parties. Others 
derive from property division considerations: the con· 
tributions of the parties to the acquisition, care and 
maintenance of the marital property, how and when 
specific items were acquired. It is indeed a potpourri, 
climaxing with a catch-all, "such other factors as the 
court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in 
order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary 
award." lo 
At this point some practitioners may question the 
necessity of this statutory proceeding, wondering 
why a support award would not accomplish the same 
objectives. However, while a support award can re-
flect a spouse's monetary and non-monetary contri-
butions to the well-being of the family and his or her 
property interests, I I the statutory limitations sur-
rounding support make it an imperfect, unreliable 
vehicle to accomplish equitable distribution. Marital 
fault precludes a support award. 12 The obligor spouse's 
death 13 and the obligee spouse's remarriage or death 1·1 
terminate any further right to support. Changed cir-
cumstances may justify a reduction in its amount. 15 
In short, the uncertain, precarious nature of a support 
award will not insure that a spouse will receive his or 
her equitable share of the accumulated marital as-
sets.1 6 
A monetary award, as a form of property settle-
ment, does not share that uncertainty. By definition, 
it is fixed, non-modifiable and therefore impervious to 
changed circumstances.!? Installment payments do 
not alter its non-modifiable nature. IS Fault will not 
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bar an EDA award, and the only fault which the court 
is directed to consider is the fault which led to the 
breakdown of the marital relationship. Post-separa-
tion adultery apparently would not even be "consi-
dered."I !) 
Under the EDA, a court may recognize a spouse's 
equitable, as well as legal , interest in marital assets. 
However, it may do so only by means of a monetary 
award; it cannot affect a spouse's legal interest in 
property. It cannot distribute or divide assets unless 
they are jointly owned by the spouses, in which case, 
the court may order partition in the divorce decree.2o 
Virginia and Maryland are the only equitable distri-
bution states which prohibit actual court distribution 
of property in a divorce proceeding.21 In actual prac-
tice, however, the difference between the Maryland-
Virginia monetary approach and that of other juris-
dictions may be more apparent than real. The court 
may approve a proposed transfer of property from one 
spouse to another in satisfaction of a monetary 
award. 22 The EDA, albeit indirectly, countenances 
the distribution of property. 
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Finally, one of the results of thi s Act may be to 
encourage spouses to execute a reason able sepa ration 
agreement. To th a t end, the EDA provides tha t the 
powers granted to the court under § 20-107.3 a re not to 
be construed to prevent the affirm a tion , ra tification 
or incorporation of the parties' sepa ration agree-
ment. Z:] 
II. Practice and Procedure under the EDA 
Virginia has no "local rules" but divorce procedures 
are vas tly different throughout the s ta te. Attorneys 
should check with each court in which th ey practice 
to determine if the EDA will cause a ny ch anges in 
loca l practices. Some of the courts may cha nge their 
procedure because of the additiona l duties imposed on 
the court by th e Act. Some may refer a ll partition 
matters to Commissioners since they are routinely 
handled this way in many courts, or may wish to refer 
to Commissioners the fact-findin g of lega l title, owner-
ship a nd valu ation of all property of th e parties and 
recommenda tions as to the characterization of the 
property as either "separate" or "marital. " However, 
cour ts are aware of the enormous ex pense of Com mis-
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sioner 's hearings and may be reluctant to expand the 
Commissioner's role. Expen ses for a ppraisers for real 
a nd persona l property , actua ries to prove the value of 
pensions, a nnuities a nd life insurance policies, econ-
omis ts to prove the value of the housewife's services, 
a nd accountan ts to trace funds and proceeds of "sep-
a ra te" property or their commingling with "marital" 
property will greatly increase the expense of the aver-
age divorce. 
Since equitable dis tribu tion is not a utomatic, it 
must be requested by the motion of either party. 
Ideally it should be part of the prayer for relief in the 
origina l Bill of Complaint or Cross-Bill . The Act does 
not indicate whether or not pa rtition of jointly titled 
property must be requested or may be ordered by the 
court on its own motion. The safer course is to request 
it in the prayer for relief. 
Every effort should be m ade to discover the a ssets 
of both parties before filing the suit. Many wives are 
unaware of a ll the "m arita l" assets, including those 
that a re jointly titled. § 20-107.3(B) makes it clear that 
sepa rately titled property may be disposed of during 
coverture without interference from the other spouse. 
Filing an immediate reques t for a § 20-103 res tra ining 
order with the Bill of Compla int m ay be necessa ry to 
prevent the other s pouse from disposing of "marital" 
property which is separately titled. The order may 
a lso direct the filing of a lis pendens, or the attorney 
may a ttempt to do this on his or her own, although it 
is not specifically authorized by the s ta tute. 
Discovery will be an a bsolute necessity, pa rticu-
larly if you a re interested in discovering the source of 
funds used to purch ase or improve various pieces of 
property or to discover assets tha t you may not have 
kn own exis ted. After discovery , your next step will be 
the divorce hearing itself, since the "circumstances 
a nd factors which contributed to the dissolution of the 
marriage, specifically including any grounds for di-
vorce,"z:] a re factors to be considered by the court in 
determining the equita ble dis tribution. After " fault" 
h as been determin ed, you ha ve rea ched the final 
hearing. 
If you a re a ttempting to cla im any property as "sep-
ara te," your client h as the burden of proof, since the 
Act s ta tes tha t a ll property acquired during the course 
of the marriage is presumed to be "marita l" property. 
Since jointly titled property is "marita l,"21 the asset 
must be titled sepa ra tely. In a long m arriage, it m ay 
be ha rd to prove the source of funds used to purchase 
an asset, resulting in a lmost a ll assets being classi-
fi ed as "ma rita l. " Absent proof of one of the follow-
ing, th e property will be classified as "marital": 
1. property protected by a n a nte-nuptial agree-
men t; 2;, 
2. property protected by a valid separation and 
property settlement agreement pursuant to § 20-109 or 
§ 20-109.1;26 
3. property acquired before the marriage by either 
party (the statute is silent on property acquired sep-
arately but in contemplation of the marriage);27 
4. property acquired during the marriage by be-
quest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a 
source other than the spouse (although the Act is si-
lent on gifts or inheritance as a result of agreement-
for instance, an agreement by a couple to take care of 
an elderly parent in return for an inheritance-some 
jurisdictions have carved out an exception for this 
type of gift or inheri tance; 28 
5. property acquired during the marriage in ex-
change for, or proceeds of, the sale of "separate" 
property, provided that it is "maintained" as separate 
property-commingling spells the termination of "sep-
arate" property;2fl 
6. income received from, and the increase in value 
of, separate property during the marriage. 30 
Suits for resulting or constructive trusts outside of 
the divorce suit will not be permitted once the court 
has "considered" the property for purposes of equita-
ble distribution. If assets are hidden and the court 
does not "consider" them, no remedy is explicitly pro-
vided. 
After hearing all the evidence, the court is directed 
to make the following findings of fact: 
(a) legal title as between the parties; 
(b) ownership and value of all real and personal 
property of the parties; and 
(c) what is "separate" and what is "marital" prop-
erty.;)1 
The Act does not make clear whether the property of 
the parties is valued and considered at the time of the 
final decree, at the time of the separation or at the 
time of the filing of the suit. By implication, the first 
sentence of § 20-107.3 indicates that the proper point 
in time is the date of the final decree. Then the court 
looks at the eleven factors set out in § 20-107.3(E)(1)-
(11) and determines whether or not an award should 
be made and, if so, how much of an award. 
The court may also partition jointly-titled property. 
The Act does not indicate that the procedure would be 
different from that set forth in § 8.01-81 et seq. How-
ever, because of the nature of partition suits, partition 
would take some time to complete. The final decree 
could conceivably order a division of real estate or 
personalty in kind. If the property was not partition-
able in kind and a sale was necessary, the final decree 
would only be able to order the division of proceeds as 
directed by the court. If a sale were ordered, it would 
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be impossible to include as part of the monetary 
award since there would be no certainty as to the pro-
ceeds of sale (which could occur months later). The 
court might choose to order a percentage division of 
the proceeds, but the Act requires a sum certain . 
§ 20-107.1 directs the court to consider "the provi-
sions made with regard to the marital property under 
§ 20-107.3" before making an alimony or child support 
award. 32 In many circumstances, the monetary award 
might dispose of the need for support, the award pro-
viding sufficient means for economic self-sufficiency. 
If the spouses have few accumulated assets, it might 
not. In such cases, the court can use the support pro-
visions to provide for need or to compensate for con-
tributions made to the well-being of the family. 
III. Important EDA Factors 
It will be two to three years before any appeals pur-
suant to the EDA reach the Virginia Supreme Court. 
Therefore, the practitioner will have to rely on deci-
sions from other states and the local rulings as they 
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develop in each jurisdiction when a rguing factors 
(E)( l)-( ll ) to the court. There is not enough space to 
cover the leading cases in detail, but the cases cited 
will give the practitioner a s tarting point. It is impor-
tant th at counsel read a pa rticular state's equitable 
distribution statute before relying on that sta te's 
cases. 
A. Presumption of Equal Division 
The Act provides for equitable distribution , not 
equa l distribution. Some equitable dis tribution s ta t-
utes require the distribution to be equa l unless that 
would not be equitable, a:l but there is no such pre-
sumption in our s tatute. Some courts have come to the 
conclusion that the starting point must be a 50-50 divi-
sion even when their sta tute does not contain this 
presumption . The relationship of a husba nd and wife 
is viewed as a partnership in which each contributes 
equally. For hundreds of years, a ll property owned as 
tenants by the entirety or joint tenants was deemed to 
belong one-half to each spouse and the 50-50 pre-
sumption merely continues this view. 34 Other courts 
have rejected this view. The New J ersey Supreme 
Court has held that a trial court cannot s ta rt with a 
50-50 presumption. Each case must be examined in-
dividua lly. :!5 In agreemen t with this view, the Wi s-
consin Supreme Court has held that t1exibility is 
required because ofth e "endless variety of human sit-
uations.":Hi 
B. Division of Joint Property 
The Maryland equitable distributi on s ta tute pro-
vides th at the court may settle an y dispute between 
the spouses with respect to ownership of real property 
and prohibits the court from tra nsferring ownership 
of property from one spouse to th e other:!? (similar to 
provisions conta in ed in our EDA).:!K In Wardl !! a 
Maryland tri al court awarded th e husba nd a ll the in-
terest in a resid ence held as tenan ts by the entirety, 
except fo r $10,000 which was deemed to be the wife's 
share. There was no dispute over the ownersh ip of the 
property since the parties admitted th at it was held as 
tenants by the entireties, each with a one-ha lf, undi-
vided interest in the property. The Maryla nd Court of 
Special Appeals held that the award was improper 
because th e trial court was attempting to transfer a 
portion of the wife's one-ha lf share to the husba nd 
and was a violation ofthe s ta tute prohibiting tra nsfer 
of ownership. The Court of Specia l Appeals criticized 
the trial court's rulin g since no specific monetary 
award was made and there was noth ing in the record 
to show whether or not the order was based upon 
s tatutorily enumerated factors. It is unclear whether 
or not the tria l cour t could h ave awarded the hus band 
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a sum certain equa l to the equity in the residence less 
$10,000 if the award h a d been based upon statutorily 
enumerated factors. 
C. Professional and Business Licenses, 
Partnership Interests 
Some s tatutes specifically exclude professiona l li-
censes or degrees from property subject to equitable 
distribution; 10 the EDA does not. Most jurisdictions 
have ruled that a spouse who helped put the other 
through professiona l sch ool a nd/or contributed to the 
success of a profession a l practice is entitled to a spe-
cia l con sideration in the division of "m arital" prop-
erty. 11 If spouses are divorced immediately a fter 
graduation from a professiona l school or there a re no 
"m arital" assets a t the time of divorce, the courts rec-
ognize the unfa irness of the results . This view is best 
expressed by the dissent in the Colorado case of In re 
Marriage of Graham: " in cases such as this, equity 
demands that courts seek extraordina ry remedies to 
preven t extraordinary injustice. If the parties h ad 
rema ined married long enough after the husband had 
completed his pos t-gradua te education so that they 
could h ave accumula ted substan tia l property, there 
would h ave been no problem .. . . Unquestion ably the 
law, in other contexts, recognizes future earning ca-
pacity as a n asset whose wrongful deprivation is 
compensable. Thus , one wh o tortiously destroys or 
im pairs a nother 's future earning capacity must pay 
as da mages the amount the injured party h as los t in 
anticipa ted futu re earnings .... The day before the 
divorce the wife h ad a legally recognized interest in 
her husba nd 's earning capacity."·12 
Some courts h ave carved out a specia l exception for 
this situation. In Horstman, I:! the Iowa Supreme 
Court held that a law degree was not property, but the 
increase in earning potentia l was. The court added 
the wife's fin a ncia l contributions to household living 
expenses and subtracted the husband 's contributions 
during the time he was a t tending law school a nd 
awarded the wife the difference- $18,000. The Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals a lso h as carved out an excep-
tion from their rule that professional licenses are not 
normally considered " property" subject to equita ble 
di s tr ibuti on. Inman ll involved a wife who helped her 
husband through denta l school and h elped him build 
a denta l practice. The parties h a d a net worth of $0 
a fter considering the liabilities a t the time of divorce. 
The Kentucky court decided that it would be inequit-
able not to award the wife a lump sum in recognition 
of her efforts. It determined th e a mount of the award 
by addin g "the amount spent for direct support a nd 
schoo]. expenses du ring the period of education , plus 
reasonable interes t a nd adjus tmen ts for inflation 
· ... "45 Oklahoma also subscribed to this view in the 
Hubbard case. IIi Mrs. Hubbard spent 12 years work-
ing and putting her husband through medical school. 
The court felt that she had an equitable claim for 
llnjust enrichment and limited their holding to the 
facts of the case. 
Most courts that hold a professional license or de-
gree is not property, have ruled that alimony is the 
spouse's remedy. If the spouse does not qualify for 
alimony according to state law (as in the Graham 
case), the spouse has no remedy. In Hill, 4 7 the wife 
was enrolled in dental school at the time of the di-
vorce and had made the larger financial contribution 
to the husband's expense while he was in dental 
school. The New Jersey Appellate Division ruled that 
the wife was entitled to rehabilitative alimony to al-
low her to finish her education. On the other hand, in 
Mahoney, 48 the same court denied even rehabilitative 
alimony to the wife since the court found both parties 
had advanced degrees and approximately equal earn-
ing capacity. In Virginia, alimony has been the tradi-
tional remedy for a spouse in the "putting hubby 
through" situation. Yet § 20-107.1 still bars alimony if 
the wife is found to be at "fault." 
Most states seem to agree that a spouse's interest in 
a business, partnership, or corporation is marital 
property to the extent acquired during the marriage. 
With medical, dental and law practices, a large por-
tion of the value of the business is goodwill. Califor-
nia and many other community property states have 
long recognized the value of goodwill although it is 
difficult to determine: ' 9 Some cases have used opinion 
evidence,5o others "capitalization of excess earnings" 
for determining the value of goodwill in ~ profes-
sional corporation,51 or the value of goodwill has been 
determined by an arm's length agreement between 
partners the husband was allowing into his profes-
sion al practice. 52 
New York is an equitable distribution state and has 
recognized goodwill as an asset, approving the "capi-
talization of excess earnings" approach to determine 
value. In Nehorayoff, 5 ~1 the court cited IRS Rev. Rul-
ing 59-60 as a guide in determining the value of 
goodwill for a professional corporation .5" Since the 
net assets of a professional practice are not usually 
appropriate for valuing the business, nor are divi-
dends paid an appropriate method, the formula used 
by the court was: the amount actually paid to the 
husband - a reasonable compensation for the services 
rendered = the earnings of the corporation. Then the 
"capitalization of earnings or capitalization of good-
will equalled the net a nnual earnings." The Califor-
nia case of Lopez55 contained a formula for valuing a 
law practice: goodwill + fixed assets (cash, furniture, 
equipment, supplies and law library) + other assets 
(accounts receivable, costs advanced with adjust-
ments for collectibility) + work in progress + work 
completed but not yet billed + husband's capital ac-
count - liabilities. In Stern/,6 the New Jersey Su-
preme Court looked to the husband's law firm's 
partnership agreement to determine its value and cal-
culated it as the amount the husband's estate would 
have received on his death + the husband's capital 
account. The court suggested an alternate method of 
valuation: (value of partners' capital accounts + ac-
counts receivable + value of work in progress + ap-
preciation oftangible personal property over the book 
value + goodwill - liabilities) x the husband's share of 
the partnership. The California case of Fonstein57 
used a similar method of valuation. It looked to the 
partnership agreement and computed the husband's 
interest in the partnership as equal to his payment 
due upon his withdrawal or death. Both Stern and 
Fonstein held that it was error to reduce the value of 
the husband's interest by the tax consequences to the 
husband should he receive the payment from the 
firm. The court was to value his interest for purposes 
of determining an equitable distribution. 
D. Tax Consequences of EDA 
The tax consequences of a transfer of appreciated 
assets in the name of one spouse to the other spouse in 
satisfaction of an equitable distribution award could 
be harsh. Since our EDA does not mandate an award 
and does not transfer or divide separately-titled "mar-
ital" property, it would probably result in capital 
gains to the transferor spouse.,,8 
E. Pensions and Retirement Plans 
Most equitable distribution and community prop-
erty states recognize pension and retirement plans as 
property. Some make a distinction between vested 
and non vested, matured or unmatured. However, that 
is not an issue in Virginia, since § 20-107.3(E)(8) al-
lows vested and non vested rights to be considered. 
Courts have adopted different methods for valuing 
this type of property. The New Jersey Appellate Divi-
sion in DiPietro 59 adopted the "total offset method" 
which assumes "that over the long run, the rate of 
inflation runs parallel with and equal to the rate of 
interest and thereby precludes the necessity of dis-
counting to arrive at present value." The court noted 
that Pennsylvania and Alaska had approved this 
method in other cases.(iQ The Maryland Supreme 
Court in Deeringli1 suggested some ways of arriving 
at a value for an unmatured pension or retirement 
plan: 
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1. add the amount of the employee's contributions 
to the fund plus interest and award the other spouse 
an equitable share; 
2. figure the present value of the retirement bene-
fits when they vest-benefits payable in the future 
would be discounted for interest, mortality and vest-
ing; 
3. determine a fixed percentage for the non-em-
ployee spouse to receive from the employee spouse's 
retirement plan when the monies are actually re-
ceived. 
Deering method #3 would seem simplest and is 
suggested by the language of § 20-107.3(G), except 
that the "present value" of such benefits is to be con-
sidered pursuant to § 20-107.3(E)(8). Thus, a court in 
Virginia may have to go through a double calcula-
tion- figuring the present value, then figuring in 
what monthly amount the award is to be paid if and 
when the retirement payments are received. However, 
the court is directed to make "a monetary award, 
payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time 
in fixed amounts."fi2 This forces the court to make 
presumptions as to the rate of inflation when ordering 
a specific dollar amount to be paid. If a spouse dies 
after receiving some retirement payments, but not all 
of the payments necessary to payoff the monetary 
award, a fixed, definite award is changed into a con-
tingent award. 
After the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
McCarty,63 military retirement pay (whether matured 
or not) could not be "considered" under § 20-107.3) 
(E)(8). Prior to McCarty, California community prop-
erty law a llowed the division of military retirement 
pay upon divorce.ol McCarty held that California 
community property laws were preempted by the fed-
eral scheme of military retirement benefits. After the 
McCarty decision, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari in Russe{l!i5 and Case. liB Both these cases denied 
consideration of military retirement benefits in equit-
able distribution states. The Supreme Court a lso va-
cated the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana 
in Miller!i? when the Montana court held that military 
retirement pay was subject to equitable distribution. 
Thus, it appeared that equitable dis tribution states 
are also precluded from considering military retire-
ment pay as part of the marital property distribution 
scheme. 
The McCarty decision followed the Supreme Court's 
earlier Hisquierda decision,li8 which held that railroad 
retirement pay is a lso not divisible upon divorce. His-
quierda supposedly carved out a narrow exception 
based upon an overriding federal interest. Justice 
Rehnquist's di ssent in McCarty raised fears about 
10 
where the Supreme Court was headed next. "Ques-
tions concerning the appropriate disposition of prop-
erty upon the dissolution of marriage, therefore, such 
as the question in this case, are particularly within 
the control of the states, and the authority of the 
states should not be displaced except pursuant to the 
clearest direction from Congress . . . Today's decision 
is not simply a logical extension of prior precedent."69 
What other retirement plans would the Supreme 
Court decide to preempt? Private pensions and re-
tirement plans regulated by the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act??O Civil Service pensions? 
Then Congress acted to show a clear legislative in-
tent. On September 9, 1982, President Reagan signed 
HR 6030 into law. As we go to press, a copy of the act 
was not available, but some of its provisions are 
known . The act effectively reverses the McCarty deci-
sion by a llowing state law to determine whether or 
not military retirement pay is "property." 
However, the act adds restrictive requirements: 
l. The state court may exercise this authority only 
if it has jurisdiction over the service member: 
a. by reason of the member's residence in the 
state other than because of military orders, 
b. the member's domicile is in the state, or 
c. the member consents. 
2. The Court order must certify that the rights of 
the service member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' 
Civil Relief Act were complied with. 
The new law is helpful in many respects, but it still 
leaves McCarty in place for contested divorces in 
which the service member's domicile is elsewhere and 
he or she resides in this state only because he or she is 
stationed here. If it is impossible for a spouse to meet 
the residence and domicile requirements of the mem-
ber's state of domicile, the spouse may be out of luck 
unless the state of domicile authorizes an equitable 
distribution or community property division after di-
vorce in another state. 
IV. Suggestions for Legislative 
Change to the EDA 
Total reliance on a monetary award to reflect a 
spouse's equitable interest in marital property has 
one distinct disadvantage: it may overcompensate or 
undercompensate the receiver spouse. Of necesssity, 
the monetary award must be based on the value ofthe 
property at the time of the decree. After the decree, 
that value may change substantially. The risk ofloss 
(decrease in the value of the property) and the possi-
bility of gain (increase in the value of the property) 
rest entirely with the legal title holder. Other jurisdic-
tions avoid this problem because actual distribution 
of the assets distributes the risk of gain or loss. On the 
other hand, the monetary award approach avoids the 
hardship entailed in "distributing" an asset that is 
distinctly nondistributable, such as the family farm, 
or an on-going business.? I 
Equitable distribution, if ordered to be paid in in-
stallments, still may not give 100 percent protection 
to a spouse. As a property settlement, it is subject to 
discharge in bankruptcy.72 Also, some obligor spouses 
have a habit of disappearing into the night, never to 
be found again, making enforcement impossible. A 
lump sum award avoids these problems. 
The EDA's definitions of "marital" and "separate" 
property pose several different questions. The Act 
does not, for example, define how one "maintains" 
property as separate property. Is title conclusive or 
will use be influential? Assume H buys a home before 
marriage. It is separate property because it was ac-
quired before marriage. After marriage, title remain-
ing only in H's name, W pays the mortgage or 
substantially renovates it, increasing its value signif-
icantly. According to the definition, the house is sep-
arate property and unavailable as a basis for a mone-
tary award. That potential unfairness prompted New 
York to exclude from separate property appreciation 
in separate property due to the contribution or efforts 
of the other spouse.?;] Although it involves compli-
cated tracing problems, the New York approach 
seems fairer. 
Until the moment before the divorce decree, all 
property acquired by either party will be deemed to be 
marital property. This would include property ac-
quired after the parties' separation, and regardless of 
the length of their separation. The definition of mari-
tal property should have an earlier concluding point 
than the divorce decree. Property acquired after sepa-
ration, or an a mensa decree or 'the institution of di-
vorce proceedings should be deemed separate prop-
erty. 
The EDA should require the court to state the rea-
soning for its monetary award determination.?·1 Such 
a requirement would limit the potential for arbitrary 
judicial action and make appellate review possible. 
The EDA fails to provide the court with jurisdiction 
to enter a monetary award after an ex parte divorce 
decree in another state. Many states allow such an 
award, but Virginia courts have jurisdiction to con-
sider a monetary award only upon annulment or di· 
vorce. An ex parte decree from another state would 
preclude the court from assuming that jurisdiction. 
For purposes of clarity, separate property should be 
defined to include "property described as separate 
property by written agreement of the parties ... "7 5 
This would reinforce the thought contained in § 20-
107.3(H) that valid ante-nuptial agreements are en-
forceable. 
Although not specifically mentioned in the EDA, 
the degree to which a spouse dissipates assets should 
be considered. Some statutes7H specifically mention it 
and certainly it should be a factor in determining a 
spouse's equitable interest in the existing assets. 
V. Conclusion 
As the courts begin to apply the EDA, practitioners 
will learn more about it. Inevitably, the legislature 
will make modifications to fine tune the Act. For all 
its complexity and difficulties, the EDA should ensure 
a fairer distribution of assets upon divorce. 
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